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Abstract: Objectives: This study examined the effects of ownership structure on firm value of Nigerian deposit money 
banks. It also evaluated the relationship between ownership structure variables (concentrated, managerial and foreign) on 
firm value (Return on Equity and Return on Asset). Prior Work: Few research works have covered ownership structure and 
corporate governance in Nigeria. As a company’s ownership structure changes and ownership is separated from control, 
incentive alignment problems become evident and the need for more research. Approach: The study used a sample of fifteen 
(15) banks quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  The study employed secondary data which was obtained from Audited 
Report of Nigerian deposit money banks for a period of nine years (2008-2016). The data obtained were subjected to System 
Generalised Moment Method. Results: Findings reveal that only institutional ownership has positive and significant effect on 
financial performance while others have insignificant effect. Implications: This empirical study provided fruitful 
implications that there exist a significant effect between ownership structure and financial performance of Nigerian deposit 
money banks. Value: This study recommends that institutional shareholders should continuing using their resources and 
expertise to exercise control over management abuse of power which can affect the performance of the company.  
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Introduction 
The relationship between corporate governance mechanism (ownership structure) and the performance 
is a vital and continued subject in the field of financial management (Ezazi, Sadeghishari, Alipour & 
Amjadi, 2011). Ownership structure is one of the important factors employed in shaping the corporate 
governance system of a firm. In analyzing this relationship, up to now different aspects of ownership 
structure are considered, for instance being managerial or non-managerial shareholders, shareholders 
concentration or dispersion, being whole or retail, being internal (domestic) or being foreign 
shareholders, being institutional or individual shareholders. 
As ownership increases over time, many researchers have looked to these shareholders (managerial, 
institutional, concentrated and foreign) as potential monitors due to their monitoring advantage over 
diffuse shareholders. As they are increasing their shareholdings and their aim is to maximize their 
return on investment, thus, may create a new management discipline. Ownership structure is closely 
connected with the conflicts that can affect the operating performance of the firm. Anderson, Mansi 
and Reeb (2003) asserted that ownership structure will lead to conflict. Morey, Gottesman, Baker and 
Godridge (2008) opined that this conflict of interest might cause agency problems. As a company’s 
ownership structure changes and ownership is separated from control, incentive alignment problems 
become evident.  
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Prior studies (Afang & Bature, 2016; Marouan & Moez, 2015; Benjamin, Love & Kabiru, 2014; 
Ibrahim, 2012; among others) have examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
value or performance in other contexts including the Nigeria context. The results were mixed and 
inconclusive because it has not been clearly established as to whether or not there is any relationship 
between ownership structure and financial performance. These researchers used techniques like 
Ordinary Least Square, Least Square Regression method, Two-Stage least Square, Pooled OLS etc. 
None of these studies have examined the relationship using Generalised Moment Method (GMM). 
This is because it accommodates firm level characteristics and has the ability to address endogeneity 
bias. It proves to be the best and most efficient estimator since it uses both level and lag values as 
instruments. The question still remains whether there is any significant relationship between 
ownership structure and financial performance of DMBs in Nigeria. 
 
Literature Review 
Shareholders and Stock Ownership Structure 
As Okabe (2007) explains, shareholders exercise two types of influence over management. First, 
shareholders have a role in controlling internal management at Annual General Meetings (AGM). By 
exercising their vote at the meetings, shareholders are able to monitor and influence management by 
criticizing their performance, electing board members, fixing Auditor’s annual remunerations and 
approving or disapproving measures brought to the meeting. Second, a publicly quoted company is 
monitored by capital markets. When the business performance of a company is deteriorating, 
shareholders express their disapproval to the management by selling their shares. On the other hand, 
the management has a possibility to be controlled by another company through a hostile takeover. 
Nishizaki and Kurasawa (2002) suggest that the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring on corporate 
governance depends on stock ownership structure. 
The investors differ in terms of wealth, risk aversion and the priority they attach to shareholder value 
relative to other goals. This is because shareholder interests influence owner preferences and 
investment choices, (Kibuthu, 2005). For each of these stakeholders, preferences regarding company 
strategy will involve a trade-off between the pursuit of shareholder value and other goals. Ezazi et al. 
(2011) posited that firm performance is positively related to the majority shareholder. This single 
shareholder controls more than half of a corporation’s shares, or sometimes, one of a small group of 
shareholders who collectively control more than half of a corporation’s outstanding shares. According 
to Imam and Mahfuja (2007) majority shareholder has a negative influence on firm performance. 
Their reasons were that firms having single ultimate owner operate under strong ownership and 
therefore experience higher productivity growth. 
Ownership Structure and Financial Performance 
Alfariah, Alanezi and Almujamed (2012) investigated the effect of institutional ownership on 
performance of firm listed in Kuwait Stock Exchange. They used institutional ownership a 
independent variable and firm performance as dependent variable and firm size, firm leverage, 
dividend payout and board size as control variable. By applying two multivariate regression models, 
they found significantly positive relationship between firm performance (ROE and tobin’s q) and 
institutional ownership. In the same vein, Ibrahim (2012) examined the effects of ownership structure 
on the performance of listed companies on the Ghana stock exchange. The study covers a period of 
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2005 to 2009, and the Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation and Logistic Regression was applied on 
performance indicators such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and dividend yield 
(DY) while foreign ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration was used to 
measure ownership structure. The study found that there is a significant negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm’s performance while insider ownership and institutional ownership 
has positive relationship with performance of listed companies on Ghana stock exchange. Also, 
Anthony (2012) investigated the effect of ownership structure on financial performance of companies 
listed in Nairobi stock exchange. The study is conducted based on a sample of 62 listed companies 
during the period of 2009 to 2013 using the regression analysis and correlation method to test the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The findings revealed that 
concentration ownership has positive relationship on firm performance (ROE) while managerial 
ownership and control variable (leverage) was not significant. Moreover, Alexander, Moses and 
Ransford (2014) examined the effects of Ownership Structure on the performance of listed Companies 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange from 2008 - 2012 using financial companies listed on Ghana stock 
exchange. The study employed Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation and logic regression. The study 
found that there is a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance (ROE and ROA) while manager (Insider) ownership and foreign ownership have positive 
and significant effect on firm performance (ROE and ROA).  
Gayan and Shanika (2016) investigate the effect of ownership structure on firm performance of listed 
manufacturing companies in Sri Lanka. The sample of the study was 20 companies and data were 
analysed using correlation analysis and Multi- variant analysis. The study found that the block 
ownership have negative and insignificant relationship with ROE. Institutional ownership has positive 
and insignificant relationship with ROE, and also firm size has positive and significant relationship 
with ROE. However, Berķe-Berga, Dovladbekova, and Abula (2017) examined on the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance, using regression analysis. The study sampled 52 
listed companies on Nasdaq Riga, Nasdaq Tallinn and Nasdaq Vilnius stock exchanges, in Baltics 
from 2010-2015. The results reveal that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and internal performance measure (ROA). 
In Nigeria, very few studies were conducted concerning ownership structure and firm value. 
Uhomoibhi (2007) examined the impact of ownership structure on bank profitability in Nigeria, using 
98 commercial and merchant banks for the period of 15 years (1989-2004). The study used Pooled 
Regression technique and t-test in the analysis and the study use institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership and private ownership to measure the ownership structure and return on equity was used to 
measure bank profitability. The study finds that ownership structure has no significant impact on ROE 
in Nigeria. 
Benjamin, Love and Kabiru (2014) examined the impact of ownership structure on the financial 
performance of listed insurance firms in Nigeria. The study uses panel data for seventeen (17) firms 
for the period 2001 – 2010 (10 years) using least square regression method. The study focuses on two 
aspects of two independent variables to measure ownership structure which are managerial ownership 
and institutional shareholding while Firm’s performance has been measured through Return on Asset 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Findings indicate that there is a positive significant relationship 
between ownership structure (institutional and managerial) and firm’s performance as measured by 
ROA and ROE. Afang and Bature (2016) assessed the impact of ownership structure on the financial 
performance, using listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. A panel data multiple regression model is 
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used for analysis of data. Findings show that managerial and foreign ownership has negatively 
impacted the performance of listed conglomerate firms within the study period, while firm size 
positively impacted the firm performance. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Agency theory 
The principle underlining the issue of corporate governance is the agency theory developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) resulting out of the separation of ownership and control. Under this theory, the 
main concern is to develop rules and incentives, based on implicit or explicit contracts, to eliminate or 
at least, minimize the conflict of interests between the owners and the managers (Akpan & Riman, 
2012). This theory also suggests that different types of ownership could have different effects on the 
performance of a firm. It has been recognised that modern firms are seen to suffer from separation of 
ownership and control and hence professional managers (agents) run these firms and they cannot be 
held accountable by dispersed shareholders (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008). To minimize these 
shortcoming various governance mechanisms aimed at aligning the interests of agents with those of 
principals, including equity ownership by few individuals, managers, institutions or foreign, may be 
considered. The agency theory as formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) asserted that the 
ownership structure can affect firm performance. Based on this, the study formulated the hypothesis: 
H0: There is no significant relationship between ownership structure and financial performance of 
deposit money banks in Nigeria 
 
Methodology 
The model employed in this study was panel data model employed by Benjamin et al. (2014).    For 
each cross section unit i and period t, the following model is estimated: 
PERFORMANCEit = β0 +β1 MOWNit +  β2 INOWNit +εit 
Where: Where: PERFORMANCEit stand for dependent variable (Return on Equity and Return on 
Asset), B stand for the model parameters MOWNit  is managerial ownership and INOWNit is 
institutional investors. 
This model was then modified as below: 
PEFORMANCEit = β0 + β1 PEFORMANCEit-1 + β2 CONCit + β3 INOWNit + β4 MOWNit + β5 FOWNit + 
β6SIZEit + β7DEBTit + β8 GROWTHit + β9 DPSit + εit 
Where: 
Performance  = ` Financial performance (proxy with ROE and ROA) 
FOWN   =  Foreign Ownership           MOWN  = Managerial Ownership  
INOWN  =  Institutional Ownership  CONC =Ownership Concentration  
SIZE   =  Company Size   DEBT = Debt ratio,  
GROWTH  =  growth ratio   DPS =Dividend per share 
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β0 = the intercept/constant; β1- β9=  are the parameters; μ = error term; Number of firms; 
=      Time period 11years (2008-2016) 
A priori expectation is that β1, β2, β3, β4 and β9 > 0 
Table 4.1. Variables Definition and Measurements 
Variables Measurements 
Return on Equity This is calculated by dividing earnings after interest and tax into 
total equity which is based on this study of Tian and Zeitun (2007) 
Return on Asset This is calculated by dividing earnings after interest and tax into 
total assets which is based on the study of Jiraporn and Liu (2008)   
Ownership Concentration 
 
This is measured in line with Thomsen (2004) as the number of 
shares held by the largest shareholders divided by the total ordinary 
shares issued. 
Institutional Ownership 
 
This is measured in line with Kouki and Guizani (2009) and Lamba 
and Stapledon (2001) as proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors to the total number of shares issued (those that held 5% 
and above) 
Managerial Ownership 
 
This is measured in line with Salehi, Mohmoud and Heydari (2012) 
as the proportion of shares held by managers and executive directors 
divided by the total number of shares issued 
Foreign Ownership 
 
This is measured in line with Salehi, Mohmoud and Heydari (2012) 
as the total of shares held by foreigner divided by the total number 
of shareholdings. 
Size This is measured as natural logarithm of total assets and in line with 
Salehi, Mohmoud and Heydari (2012) 
Growth The study uses percentage of variation assets of firm in year t into 
year t-1 and in line with  
Salehi, Mohmoud and Heydari (2012). 
Debt This is measured in line with the study of Salehi, Mohmoud and 
Heydari (2012) as the ratio of total debts ( long term and short term 
debts) to total assets  
DPS Dividend paid divided by the total number of share holding issued as 
used by Berķe-Berga, Dovladbekova and Abula (2017). 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2017 
The study employed ex-post facto research design because it allows for the collection of past and 
multi-dimensional data which provide basis for the full establishment of the relationship between 
ownership structures on the value of DMBs in Nigeria. The choice of this sector was based on the fact 
that its instability might leads to a contagion effect, which usually affects a class of banks or even the 
entire financial system and the economy. The target population is the nineteen (19) deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. The data covers the period of 2008-2016 (9 years). The choice of year 2008 is 
because of the financial crisis that happened which shook the NSE, thereby affected ownership 
structure of firm. As at the time of research, 2017 annual report cannot be assessed. The sample of the 
study is fifteen (15) quoted deposit money banks on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) as at 31st July 
2017 using purposive non-probability sampling method by selecting only DMBs quoted on the NSE. 
The data for this research were collected from secondary sources by assessing the selected DMBs 
audited annual reports. The study employed the System generalised method of moments (SYSGMM) 
estimator. According to Schultz, Tan, and Walsh (2010) the dynamic generalized method of moments 
(GMM) panel specifications, as developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and  Arellano 
and Bond (1991), can overcome the estimation problems caused by unobservable heteroskedasticity, 
simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity, and produce unbiased and consistent estimates by employing 
valid internal instruments during estimation.  
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Results 
Regression Analysis 
Effect of Ownership Structure on Financial Performance (ROE and ROA) of Deposit Money 
Banks 
The two measures of Profitability in this research work are Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). In ROA model, size, debt, growth and DPS are instrumented because of endogeneity 
problem while in ROE model each of the ownership structures (i.e. managerial, institutional, 
concentrated and foreign ownership structures) and DPS are instrumented because they are suspected 
to be endogenous. The regression result that shows the effect of ownership structure on profitability of 
DMBs using ROA and ROE and controlling for Size (Total Asset), Debt, Growth ratio and Dividend 
per share (DPS), is presented in the table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Effect of Ownership Structure on Financial Performance of Deposit Money Banks 
 (1)  (2)  
VARIABLES ROA p-value ROE p-value 
L.ROA -0.0781 0.460   
 (0.106)    
L.ROE   -0.134*** 0.008 
   (0.0502)  
CONC -0.000120 0.692 -0.00268 0.408 
 (0.000302)  (0.00324)  
L.CONC   0.000957 0.638 
   (0.00204)  
INOWN 0.000570* 0.062 -0.00195 0.570 
 (0.000306)  (0.00342)  
L.INOWN   0.00706 0.156 
   (0.00497)  
MOWN -0.000573 0.144 -0.00180 0.506 
 (0.000393)  (0.00271)  
L.MOWN   0.00393 0.403 
   (0.00470)  
FOWN -0.000128 0.405 0.00273 0.564 
 (0.000154)  (0.00473)  
L.FOWN   -0.00515 0.328 
   (0.00527)  
DPS -3.47e-05 0.428 -0.00300 0.209 
 (4.38e-05)  (0.00239)  
L.DPS 4.54e-05 0.443 0.000928 0.381 
 (5.91e-05)  (0.00106)  
SIZE -0.00699 0.173 -0.0379 0.521 
 (0.00512)  (0.0591)  
L.SIZE -0.0110* 0.088   
 (0.00642)    
DEBT -0.0297 0.220 -0.366 0.310 
 (0.0242)  (0.361)  
L.DEBT 0.0403 0.410   
 (0.0489)    
GROWTH 0.00141 0.916 0.440 0.240 
 (0.0133)  (0.374)  
L.GROWTH 0.0330** 0.015   
 (0.0136)    
Constant 0.0949 0.158 0.741 0.334 
 (0.0673)  (0.768)  
     
Observations 105  102  
Wald Chi2 
p-value 
Sargan Test 
p-value 
AR test (2) 
p-value 
324.51*** 
0.000 
67.68496 
0.1572 
-.51 
0.6101 
 5.94e+09*** 
0.000 
63.96953 
0.9907 
-1.0889 
0.2762 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2017 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t          I S S N :  2 2 8 4  –  9 4 5 9          J A M  v o l .  8 ,  n o .  2 ( 2 0 1 8 )  
35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Sargan test of over identifying restrictions conducted for the two models shows chi-squared 
values of approximately 67.68 and 63.97 and p-values of 0.1572 and 0.9907 respectively. The results 
show that there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis as each of the p-values are 
greater than the conventional significance levels (i.e. 0.01, 0.05, 0.1). Not rejecting the null hypothesis 
in the two models implies that the set of instruments used are valid. The Arellano and Bond test for  
autocorrelation is applied to the differenced residuals and has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
The first and second order tests were considered but only the second other was reported. The result 
shows that there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no second order 
autocorrelation for both models. The goodness of fit of the model is measured with the Wald Chi-
squared and the result shows that the two models fit the data well since there is sufficient evidence to 
reject its null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all independent variables. Interpretations of 
individual variables are as follows. 
Lagged ROA: Under ROA model, one lagged value of ROA is seen to have an insignificant influence 
on its current value. Its p-value being greater than all conventional levels of significance indicates that 
there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that its effect is not different from zero.  
Lagged ROE: Under ROE model, one lagged value of ROE is seen to influence its current value 
negatively and significantly. The result shows that it is significant at 1% level of significance. This is 
evident from its p-value of 0.008. Its significant negative coefficient value indicates that a unit 
increase in ROE in the last period results to a decrease in ROE this period by 0.134 units. In other 
words, if ROE increases by a unit this year it results to 0.134 units decrease in it next year. 
Concentrated Ownership: this entered ROE model alongside its one period lagged value while only 
its contemporaneous value entered ROA model. However, both its contemporaneous and lagged 
values are found to be statistically insignificant in ROE model. Similarly, its contemporaneous value is 
found to be statistically insignificant in ROA model. All these are indicated by each of their p-values 
being greater than all conventional levels of significance. This implies that concentrated ownership is 
not a factor determining ROA and ROE of deposit money banks and invariably it is not a determinant 
of profitability of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Institutional Ownership: this also entered ROE 
model alongside its one period lagged value while only its contemporaneous value entered ROA 
model. However, both its contemporaneous and lagged values are found to be statistically insignificant 
in ROE model. Contemporaneous value of institutional ownership is seen to be statistically significant 
in ROA model and this is at 10% level of significance. This is evident from its p-value of 0.062. Its 
contemporaneous value has a positive effect on ROA. Statistically significant coefficient value of 
contemporaneous institutional ownership indicates that increasing it by a unit brings about 
approximately 0.0006 increase in ROA. In other words, a unit increase in institutional ownership this 
period leads to a rise in ROA this period by about 0.0006. Managerial Ownership: It entered ROE 
model alongside its one period lagged value while only its contemporaneous value entered ROA 
model. However, both its contemporaneous and lagged values are found to be statistically insignificant 
in ROE model. Similarly, its contemporaneous values is found to be statistically insignificant in ROA 
model. All these are indicated by each of their p-values being greater than all conventional levels of 
significance. This implies that managerial ownership is not a factor determining ROA and ROE of 
deposit money banks and invariably it is not a determinant of profitability of deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. Foreign Ownership: Similarly, foreign ownership entered ROE model alongside its one 
period lagged value while only its contemporaneous value entered ROA model. Similar to managerial 
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and concentrated ownership structures however, both its contemporaneous and lagged values are 
found to be statistically insignificant in ROE model. Similarly, its contemporaneous values are found 
to be statistically insignificant in ROA model. All these are indicated by each of their p-values being 
greater than all conventional levels of significance. This implies that foreign ownership is not a factor 
determining ROA and ROE of deposit money banks and invariably it is not a determinant of 
profitability of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Control Variables: The control variables in the two 
models are Size (Total Asset), Debt, Growth ratio and Dividend per share (DPS). Each of them 
entered ROE model in their contemporaneous values except DPS. In ROA model on the other hand, 
all control variables entered alongside their respective lagged values. However, only lagged values of 
size and growth are found to statistically significant in ROA model and this is at 10% and 5% levels of 
significance respectively. This is evident from each of the p-values of 0.088 and 0.015 respectively. 
All their contemporaneous values and lagged values of debt and DPS are found to be statistically 
insignificant. In ROE model on the other hand, all control variables and lagged value of DPS are 
found to be statistically insignificant. Lagged size is found to affect ROA negatively while lagged 
growth ratio is found to affect ROA positively. Statistically significant coefficient values of lagged 
size and growth in ROA model indicate that increasing each of them by a unit brings about 
approximately 0.0110 and 0.0330 units decrease and increase in ROA respectively. In other words, a 
unit increase in size this period leads to a decline in ROA next period by about 0.0110 units and a unit 
increase in growth this period leads to a rise in ROA next period by about 0.0330 units. 
Discussion of Findings 
Results from table 4.2., show that ownership structure does not have significant effect on ROE. This 
means that shareholders have no capacity to monitor managers or influence decision making or due to 
their passive role in monitoring managers leading to insignificant influence on ROE of DMBs in 
Nigeria. This consistence with the findings of Uhmoibhi (2007); Almujamed (2012); Sebastine et al. 
(2014) and Gayan and Shanika (2016) but against the works of Ibrahim (2012) and Benjamin et 
al.(2014). Moreover, concentrated ownership does not effect on ROA. This implies that concentrated 
ownership is not a factor determining ROA. This is consistence with the works of Ibrahim (2012); 
Alexander et al. (2014) but against the finding of Sebastine et al. (2014).However, institutional 
ownership contemporaneous value has a positive significant effect on ROA. This means that the 
existence of institutional shareholders might discipline management for better performance, due to 
their power to influence board decisions, absorb the cost of effective monitoring, and engage in active 
ownership. This supported by Ibrahim (2012); Benjamin et al. (2014) and Zuriawati et al. (2014)  
While, managerial ownership does not have significant effect on ROA. This implies that managerial 
ownership is not a factor determining ROA of DMBs in Nigeria. It may due to low motivation to work 
by the managers or a weak sense of belonging towards the business success. This is consistence with 
the finding of Anthony (2012) but against the work of Mahmud et al. (2010). Similarly, foreign 
ownership does not have statistically significant effect on ROA. Invariably it is not a determinant of 
ROA of deposit money banks in Nigeria. This is supported by Zuriawati et al. (2014). For control 
variables, Lagged size is found to affect ROA negatively while lagged growth ratio is found to affect 
ROA positively. This means that previous growth opportunities of DMBs in Nigeria influence the 
current profitability of the banks. This is consistence with the findings of Zuriawati et al. (2014). 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study concludes that institutional ownership have positive significant effect on financial 
performance of DMBs in Nigeria. Other ownership have insignificant effect on financial performance. 
Based on the conclusion the study therefore recommends that Institutional shareholders should 
continuing using their power, resources and expertise to exercise control over management abuse of 
power which can affect the performance of the firm. 
 
References 
Afang, H.A. & Bature M.D. (2016). Ownership structure and the financial performance of listed conglomerate firms in 
Nigeria. The Business and Management Review, 7(3), pp. 231-240. 
Akpan, E.S. & Riman. H.B. (2012). Does corpoarte governance affect Bank’s profitabilty? Evidence from Nigeria. 
International Journal of Contemporary Research, 2(7), pp. 135-145. 
Alexander, O.; Moses, O. & Ransford Q. (2014). Effects of ownership structure on the performance of listed companies on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange. Archives of business research, 2(4), pp. 71-87. 
Alfaraih, M.; Alanezi, F. & Almujamed, H. (2012). The Influence of Institutional and Government ownership on firm 
performance: Evidence from Kuwait. International Business Research, 5(10), pp. 192- 200. 
Anderson, R.C.; Mansi, S.A. & Reeb, D.M. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency cost. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 68, pp. 263–285. 
Anthony, O. & Chinaemerem, O.C. (2012). Impact of capital structure on the financial performance of Nigerian firms, 
Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 1(12), pp. 43-61. 
Arellano. M. & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to 
employment equation. Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 277–297. 
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal 
of Econometrics, 68, pp. 29-51. 
Benjamin, K.; Love, O. & Kabiru, I. (2014). Impact of ownership structure on the financial performance of listed insurance 
firms in Nigeria. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 4(1), pp. 
409-416. 
Berķe-Berga, A; Dovladbekova, I. & Abula, M. (2017). Managerial ownership and firm performance: Evidence of listed 
companies in the Baltics: Polish Journal of Management Studies, 15(2), pp. 13-20. 
Ezazi, M.S.; Sadeghisharif, S.J.; Alipour, M. & Amjadi, H. (2011). The effect of ownership structure on share price volatility 
of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange: An empirical evidence of Iran. International Journal of Business and Social 
Science, 2(5), pp. 163-169. 
Gayan, M.A. & Shanika, I. (2016). Impact of ownership structure on firms’ performance of manufacturing companies in Sri 
Lanka. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 6(10), pp. 111-123. 
Gordon, M.J. (1959). Dividends, earnings, and stock prices. Review of Economics and Statistics, 41, pp. 99-105. 
Holtz-Eakin, D.; Newey, W. & Rosen, H. (1988). Estimating vector autoregressions with panel data. Econometrica, 56, pp. 
1371–1395. 
Ibrahim, H. (2012). Corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family-ownership in Malaysia. 
International Journal of Economics & Finance, 3(1), pp. 105–115 
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 3(13), pp. 305-360. 
Jiraporn, P. & Liu, Y. (2008). Capital structure, staggered boards, and firm value, Financia Analysts Journal, 64(1), pp. 49–
60. 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t          I S S N :  2 2 8 4  –  9 4 5 9          J A M  v o l .  8 ,  n o .  2 ( 2 0 1 8 )  
38 
Kibuthu, A. (2005). The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 2(33), pp. 335–59. 
Kouki, M. & Guizani, M. (2009). Corporate governance and dividend policy in Poland. Warsaw School of Economics, 
World Economy Research Institute, Poland. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2008).Corporate governance and firm performance in Africa: A dynamic panel data analysis. 
Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 32(2), pp. 1-24. 
Lamba, A.S. & Stapledon, G. (2001). The Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure, Australian Evidence. Australia: 
University of Melbourne. 
Mahmud, R.; Ibrahim, M.K. & Pok, W.C. (2010). Earnings quality, managerial ownership and firm performance. Malaysian 
evidence. Paper presented at the meeting of AFAANZ 2010, Christchurch Convention Hall, New Zealand. 
Marouan, K. & Moez, D. (2015). Impact of corporate governance on shareholder value creation: evidence from Tunisian 
Context. International Business Research, 8(5), pp. 262-270. 
Mohd-Ali, A.; Ali-Ahmed, H.J. & Nazrul, M. (2006). The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage 
least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period: evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. International 
Business & Economics Research Journal, 5(5), pp. 51-64. 
Morey, M.; Gottesman, A.; Baker, E. & Godridge, B. (2008). Does better corporate governance result in higher valuations in 
emerging markets? Another examination using a new data set. Journal of Banking & Finance, 10, pp. 12-19.  
Nishizaki, K. & Kurasawa, M. (2002). Stock ownership structure and corporate value in Japanese. Working Paper Series, 
Financial Markets Department, Bank of Japan.  
Okabe, M. (2007). Japanese firms and Merger & Acquisition. Tokyo: Tokyo Keizai Shinpo. 
Roodman, D. (2009). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), pp. 
135-158. 
Sargan, J.D. (1958). The estimation of economic relationships using instrumental variables. Journal of Econometrica, 26, pp. 
393-415. 
Salehi, M. & Baezegar, B. (2011). A survey of empirical studies on management ownership. Africa Journal of Business 
Management, 5(7), pp. 7188-7197. 
Salehi, M.; Mohmoud, M. & Heydari, A. (2012). A study of the relationship between institutional investors and corporate 
value: empirical evidence of Iran. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 8(1), pp. 72-76. 
Schultz, E.L.; Tan, D.T. & Walsh, K.D. (2010). Endogeneity and the corporate governance-performance relation. Australian 
journal of Management, 35(2), p. 145. 
Thomsen, S. (2004). Impact of corporate reputation on performance: some Danish evidence. European Management Journal, 
22(2), pp. 201-210. 
Tian, G.G. & Zeitun, R. (2007). Does ownership affect a firm’s performance and default risk in Jordan? Corporate 
Governance Journal, 7(1), pp. 66-82.  
Uhmoibhi, T.A. (2007). Impact of ownership structure on bank profitability in Nigeria. African Journal of Accounting, 
Economics, Finance and Banking Research, 4(4), pp. 61-75. 
